Ingrid Betancourt Blows the Whistle on the Ultimate Myth: Colombia’s “War on Drugs”

Kanchana Henrich

Submitted on March 13, 2002

Professor David Weddle

The Opening Scene

On February 23^rd, 2002, Colombia’s largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known as the FARC) kidnapped presidential candidate and Green Party member Ingrid Betancourt.  Colombia’s 38-year-old civil war has come to a head once again after peace negotiations between the government and the FARC were halted on February 20^th.  Change is in the air with congressional and presidential elections around the corner, and the many warring factions within the country are lashing out.  All feel the tension and opportunity that faces them, and each will take whatever actions are necessary to ensure that their desires are fulfilled.  The FARC demands that in return for the abducted senator and five other captive congressmen, the Colombian government must release 200 guerrillas currently imprisoned.  They gave the government an ultimatum of one year to adhere to their regulations before they will take the “necessary actions.”

Colombia has come to a pivotal point in its history.  The Colombian people are tired of the incessant violence that riddles their country, and opportunity for change is at hand.  This country’s breakdown amplifies the current catastrophic predicament that much of the world now faces: mass destruction or peace.  René Girard in his book The Scapegoat claims that we are able to recognize that the world has arrived at this crucial moment because there is a complete lack of differentiation between what is right and wrong.  No one can determine the difference between what has been deemed “good violence” as opposed to “bad violence.”  Thus, humanity is simply left with violence.

The kidnapping of Betancourt has brought an exceptional amount of international attention to the violence and human rights violations occurring every day in Colombia.  Could her disappearance rally the international community to insist on resolution for this desperate country?  Girard points out that although such a sacrifice has succeeded in resolving conflict in the past, this method of scapegoating the problem does not work anymore. The myth perpetuating the violence must be unveiled.

Ingrid Betancourt has stepped up to reveal the truth.  She proposes that corruption, particularly in the political sphere, allows the cycle of violence in Colombia to continue.   Her propositions for peace are acknowledging the corruption that pervades politics and attacking its source, drug money.  These claims directly threaten the myth that Colombia’s government is working in the interest of the people, and mandates systemic change.  In order to uphold the myth, Betancourt’s enemies move to use her as a scapegoat.  However, as Girard exemplifies in his text, the scapegoat mechanism no longer works to create lasting peace.  Thus, the desired sacrifice of Betancourt would do nothing to resolve the incessant bloodshed in Colombia.

A Crisis At Hand

Violence has consumed Colombia for over a hundred years.  Preceding the current civil war Colombia endured what is now termed La Violencia (the Violence).  La Violencia, 1946-1964 was a period of heightened conflict between the staunchly loyal members of both the Liberal and Conservative Parties. [1]   Each party attempted to cleanse themselves of the other, eventually leading to the formulation of military factions.  In the 1950s the Liberals formed what are now known as guerrilla groups.  Hence, in opposition, Conservatives created counterguerrilla groups, which would become known as “paramilitaries.” [2]   This ideological political battle continued, while at the same time violence erupted on the local level.  Violence became the means by which to accomplish economic security and superiority.  Landowners, backed by hired guerrillas, forced farmers to sell their land to them, and insured their entitlement through guerrilla protection. [3]   At that time, it was known in the rural areas that the conservative gangs dealt in stolen coffee, while the liberal bands worked in the stolen cattle trade. [4]  

These struggles between the guerrillas and the “paramilitaries” disintegrated in the 1960s, and the insurgent groups refocused, beginning the civil war that rages on today.  The guerrillas developed into revolutionaries fighting for transformation of the social order and government structure, and the military and paramilitary response grew in reaction.  In addition, in the 1980s the drug trade was introduced to Colombia.  Today, narco-traffickers and drug lords play a fundamental role in the ongoing violence that penetrates their society.  They fund, directly and indirectly, all the major players that uphold the violence in Colombia: the guerrillas, the FARC and the ELN, the state militia and the paramilitaries.

The FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)

The FARC began as a peasant defensive movement, hired to protect peasant communities against one another. [5]   As was mentioned above, in the mid 20^th century there was much feuding over property rights between farmers, and the FARC benefited economically by providing security to these groups.  The transformation of the FARC from a stationary, peasant self-defense movement to a mobile, offensive guerrilla movement happened in reaction to attacks initiated by the state in 1964. [6]   Right-wing members of the state suddenly became abhorred at the fact that there allegedly existed sixteen independent republics in the nation.  They desired unity, and targeted the peasant self-defense organizations as insurgents to attain their goal.  The FARC redefined their identity and mobilized in response. [7]

They functioned for many years as the military wing of the Communist movement in Colombia.  However, in the mid-1980s, the collapse of the Soviet Union, failed peace talks with the government as well as the entrance of narco-traffickers into their territories caused them to once again reformulate their identity.  Originally promoters of land reform and better working conditions for agricultural workers, the FARC became firmly established in 1990 in the drug trade. [8]

Today, the FARC are involved in and tax every stage of the drug business.  They cultivate coca plants, poppies and marijuana.  They supply the chemicals needed to process the coca plant into cocaine and the opium poppy into heroin.  Furthermore, they charge for the drugs to be transported from illegal airstrips they own to its destination.  The FARC, estimated to be the wealthiest guerrilla group in the world, makes at least $300 million a year from the drug trade alone.  They have additional income from kidnapping and extortion. [9]

The current conflict between the FARC and the present government, headed by President Andrés Pastrana, stems from peace agreements that commenced when Pastrana came into office in 1998.  In an effort to establish peace the President granted the FARC approximately 17,000 square miles in southeast Colombia as a safety zone. [10]   This was the FARC’s reward for entering peace negotiations.  The agreement gave the FARC the opportunity to strengthen their forces over the past four years.  Their membership numbers are now extremely high, approximately 17,000, and they have had the time and financial ability to train recruits, import arms and export drugs.  Since the initiation of peace talks tension has grown between the two parties.  On February 20^th President Pastrana terminated the peace agreement on the grounds that the FARC had violated it by hijacking a commercial airliner and kidnapping a senator on board.  As soon as the state militia entered FARC territory they found mass quantities of coca and poppies.  A recent article in the New York Times included a statement by the Colombian anti-narcotics police chief, General Gustavo Socha, saying that “as soon as the peace talks ended, we began surveillance and discovered 856 acres of poppy cultivation that didn’t exist before,” and “37,065 acres of coca leaf.” [11]

Since February 20^th conflict between the FARC and government forces has escalated.  The army moves to take serious action against the guerrillas, and the FARC, infuriated that Pastrana broke their agreement, has been targeting the infrastructure of the country.  They are bombing electrical towers, telecommunications towers, bridges needed to transport essentials and municipal waterworks.  They have left 10 percent of the country’s urban centers in total darkness and 76 cities and towns have had their phone service cut off. [12]   Estimates for electrical repairs come to about $10 million and another $20 million to re-establish telecommunication lines. [13]

The ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)

The ELN, the second largest guerrilla movement in Colombia, shares the goal of social reform with the FARC, however ideologically the two groups differ greatly.  The ELN was inspired by the triumph of Fidel Castro’s revolution in Cuba, and to this day strictly adheres to the doctrine set forth during that time by Che Guevara.  Che’s theory on the success of revolutionary movements includes the establishment of a pivotal rural guerrilla group focused on gaining the support of the peasantry, who are backed by urban allies. [14]

The ELN originated in 1962 when a group of university students denounced the reforms taking place within the Communist Party and moved towards a more Marxist-Leninist doctrine.  In 1965 they began formally establishing their movement when a man named Fabio Vásquez Castaño returned from Cuba ready to lead the way.  He shaped the group grounded in Che’s doctrine, and established a rural guerrilla focus with urban support.  Vásquez contributed to the success of the ELN as their leader until 1973. Due to internal strife he chose to abandon his cause and retired to Havana.  At that time, the ELN struggled with an ambiguous relationship between their political objectives and military operations, conflict between individual ideologies and personal rivalries.  The chaos finally concluded in ritual executions, thus weeding out controversy. [15]

The ELN suffered as a financially and ideologically unsupported group until the 1980s when they discovered two new sources of income: kidnapping and the oil industry.  Headed by their new leader Manual Pérez, a Catholic priest, the ELN developed into not only a military force but also a group focused on social work. [16]   Pérez emphasized a relationship between social movements and labor unions, and denied the ELN an opportunity to become heavily involved in the drug trade.  It was his anti-narcotic stance that did not allow the ELN to see the same financial gains as the drug dealing FARC. [17]   Pérez died in 1998 leaving the ELN in the hands of a long time member Nicolas Rodriguez. [18]  

Today the ELN still advocate social reform and the implimentation of a Communist regime.  Unlike their neighbor guerrillas the FARC, they do not participate to the same extent in the drug trade and are somewhat open to peace talks with the government.  These two factors have taken them out of the spotlight as far as the government is concerned.  State forces thus focus on the much more massive and supposedly more threatening FARC.  However, the ELN are still involved in much of the violence that occurs every day in Colombian neighborhoods, and are responsible for a very large number of kidnappings in the country every year, including a reported 800 in 2001. [19]

The Paramilitaries

The paramilitaries of Colombia are the players within the armed movement with the most obscure identity.  They originated as a reactionary group to the guerrillas, and still claim that their role is to protect the people from the rebel forces.  However, it has been documented that the paramilitaries themselves have been responsible in recent years for countless civilian deaths.  “The death squads arrive in communities in areas of guerrilla influence with a list in hand.  The list contains names of suspected guerrilla sympathizers.  All those on the list are killed, usually in front of their families and in a most gruesome manner.  The message is brutally simple: support the guerrillas and you will die.” [20]   Safford and Palacios claim that the paramilitaries transformed quite quickly from a defensive group to an offensive group.  Now their job is to prevent an increase in support for the guerrillas.  This objective allows them much leeway in their actions.  They are seen by most of the populace as killers.  The government and its army turn a blind eye to the paramilitary’s actions.  Many paramilitaries are ex-communists or ex-guerrillas. [21]

The paramilitaries have also acquired the role of defending drug lords.  It is quite profitable participating in these armies, and the paramilitary forces have amassed today to somewhere around 9,000. [22]   The dramatic growth of the paramilitaries is additionally due to their connection to the state militia.  It is said that both the government and wealthy landowners, tired of being stolen from by guerrillas, finance their campaigns. [23]   The current head of the paramilitary, Carlos Castaño, officially established the movement in 1997 under the title the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (or AUC). [24]

The National Army and the Narco-Traffickers

The final two players in the violent drama of Colombian life are undoubtedly the most important.  The Colombian national forces, backed by U.S. funds, are allegedly fighting to rid their country of the deadly drug trade and the brutal insurgents.  However, the reality of their motivations and actions is more than questionable.  There is no doubt that some connection exists between various drug lords and politicians.  The former president Ernesto Samper, who served from 1994-1998, was exposed in an impressionable scandal where he accepted money from the Cali cartel to finance his campaign. [25]   Betancourt’s memoir brims with examples of politicians swayed on critical issues by money or threats from drug lords.  She even quotes one of the bosses of the Cali cartel telling her “most of your fellow representatives are in our pay…about a hundred representatives [of the 186] and more than half of the [100] senators.” [26]  

Neither the government and its militia nor the drug traffickers are innocent in Colombia’s long history of violence.  Government forces pay the paramilitaries to do “what the law forbids the army to do: they carry out massacres, tortures and persecutions.” [27]   They take money from the drug lords, and allow these men to influence their policy.  The drug lords simply finance the violence, and sanction it in that way.

Ingrid Betancourt

Who is responsible and how can Colombia’s crisis be solved?  In response to such a question every faction would point their finger at another and exclaim that the opposition’s extermination is the only way to resolution.  These parties desire power and authority, and all will take whatever actions are necessary to advance their cause.  Then, the anomaly of Ingrid Betancourt comes onto the stage.  She desires to further the cause of the people, and uncover the myth that is the root of Colombia’s distress.  She claims that it is the corruption imbedded in every part of society that allows for the violence in the country to continue and even increase.  The exposure of the myth that Colombia’s diplomats are representing the people is the only means to a true solution. 

Solidifying the Myth

Each of the warring factions in Colombia believes that they participate in “good violence.”  The FARC claim to be fighting for the rights of peasants and agricultural workers.  They want to reinstate themselves as the state’s political authority in order to transform Colombia into a “true” democracy where the people really have a say about their lives. [28]   The ELN also have a clear idea of what is needed in Colombia, a socialist revolution.  Because of their radical beliefs and their commitment to enforce them through military action, the government sees these guerrillas as major threats to Colombia’s supposed democracy.  Hence, they take up arms, and hire paramilitaries to take up arms, against the guerrillas.  They have pinpointed these insurgent groups as Colombia’s central problem, and blamed all of the country’s violence on guerrilla activities.  For example, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, the presidential candidate currently leading in the polls, has won his place by taking a hard line against guerrilla violence.  He guarantees the Colombian people they will not have to tolerate such violence if he is elected. [29]   Additionally, the U.S. is currently considering expanding the policy concerning aid to Colombia.  Presently, the policy only allows funds to go towards fighting the “drug war.”  The Bush administration is considering allowing such funds to support a “counterinsurgent war.”  The paramilitaries also adhere to the belief that the guerrillas are society’s greatest problem.

All of these factions have faith in their cause, and thus are each entrapped by their own myth.  They are unwilling to admit they act mostly out of self-interest and practice corrupt politics.  All accept money from drug traffickers and thus perpetuate Colombia’s violence.  Their inability to see the action necessary to terminate Colombia’s violence, to stop supporting the drug trade, proves that they are ensnared by the myths they have created.  They keep the myths alive through rhetoric such as the “war on drugs” or the “war against Communism.”  This rhetoric is so powerful that it not only has convinced the international community that all actions to end drug trafficking are being employed, but they have even persuaded themselves that this is what is occurring.  Consequently, all lines between what is real or an illusion, what is right or wrong, have been entirely blurred.  As Girard would say, there is a complete lack of differentiation at hand and the myth has taken over.  The truth of corruption is hidden.

Girard’s theory has tremendous power because it exposes this myth.  Despite the fact that his central aim in The Scapegoat is to show how concern for the victim incapacitates the scapegoat mechanism, his product through this process of exposing the lie of myth is what is critical in the case of Colombia.

Accusation

Betancourt, since she entered Colombia’s political arena about twelve years ago, has managed to make many enemies.  Her direct attacks on political corruption have not won favor from her colleagues, but have had an impact on the hesitant and fearful Colombian populace.  It may seem, due to her recent kidnapping, that the FARC are her primary enemies.  However, they are one of many, and “by her own account, she has had so many death threats over the years from so many sources, that if it wasn’t the FARC, it would have been someone else.” [30]  

In reaction to her abduction on February 23^rd a senior commander of the FARC Fabian Ramirez accused her of having “a reputation for political stunts…” and of wanting “to stage a political show” when she attempted to enter the former rebel safety zone. [31]   Various enemies have accused her of taking actions to attract attention to herself in the hopes of political success.

After Betancourt pointed the finger at former president Ernesto Samper and marked him a corrupt fraud, the accusations came flying back at her.  It was never proven to be him, but somebody made a significant effort to deface her as unethical.  She was accused of being aligned with drug traffickers, of not being a good Catholic and of being a bad mother because she chose to leave her children in the care of her ex-husband in secure New Zealand.  The charges brought against her of taking money from drug traffickers were eventually dropped based on the lack of conclusive evidence.

Rather than attempting to indict her, politicians have recently ignored her.  They are not excessively worried about her winning the presidential race with recent poles maintaining that 2 percent of the population supports her.  Until she uncovers another scandal she is better off left untouched. Although, currently she is totally incapacitated as an abductee, and it is not likely that many of her opponents are mourning her absence.

Girard in his conversation about sacrifice refers to the mob that unifies around a victim as the persecutors.  Betancourt’s persecutors are her political enemies listed above.  They are the one’s who would benefit by scapegoating her. 

Persecutors’ Motives

            Betancourt is a direct threat to the way politics function in Colombia.  She attempts to expose the corruption, the acceptance of drug money, which all the military factions strive to conceal.  But, does her threat lie deeper than her accusations?  Could she be a threat to the natural human attribute of desire?

Girard introduces in his book The Scapegoat the concept of mimetic desire.  He claims that what many deem a natural emotion, desire, is actually a learned reaction.  Humans learn by copying one another, and thus the feeling of wanting something that one does not have is only learned through interaction with others.  If every individual lived in an isolated state she would not know desire, for she would not know of anything different than what was present before her.  Thus, how could she want anything more?

Girard’s claim is that all human beings are propelled in their lives by mimetic desire; we want what we don’t have.  Because we desire more than we have, conflict and competition arise at our attempts to fill the empty holes.  Mimetic desire is limitless, and thus conflict only escalates endlessly.  That is, of course, until something is done to tame it.  This is where the ritual of sacrifice becomes relevant.

By looking back into history one can see that cultures all over the world have practiced sacrifice both in the literal and figurative sense.  Sacrificial rituals often entail placing all of the negative attributes of a community on a selected victim, and then killing that victim.  Thus, the act of sacrifice rids the community of its blemishes.  The victim is consequentially a scapegoat for the community.  The community does not have to face its problems, and the symbolic discarding of the “cause of trouble” allows for solidarity.

The suggestion here is that the endless cycle of violence apparent in Colombia has its roots in mimetic desire.  All the Colombian politicians and military factions are fueled by a mimetic desire for power.  This mimetic desire has lead in Colombia’s case to debilitating corruption.  So, the Colombians are currently faced with two choices: either they can scapegoat the crisis with a sacrifice, or they can face the cause of their downfall, corruption fed by mimetic desire.

The difficulty with sacrifice, as Girard points out, is that it is not a permanent solution.  Inevitably, new conflict arises within communities, and thus a new sacrifice would be needed to bring about peace.  Ingrid Betancourt’s sacrifice will be a failure.  Even if it were to provide temporary stability between the warring factions, it would not last because someone else would step up to identify the myth that hides corruption.

Persecutors’ True Identity

It is easy to label the guerrillas, the FARC and the ELN, the paramilitaries as persecutors.  There is no doubt that each group intimidates, oppresses and murders.  However, are they really the ones responsible for the continuation of the heinous crimes that take place daily in Colombia?  Any political or social movement has to be supported financially to survive.  It is obvious that the narco-traffickers are thriving because of the demand for their product.  They pull in millions of dollars a year that is allocated to all the players, including the FARC and the paramilitaries.  The ELN, unwilling to be entirely sponsored by drugs, has found alternate means for survival through kidnapping for ransom and stealing money from the oil industry.  So then who funds the supposedly anti-narcotic state military?

The National army receives a large share of their finances from the U.S.  Former President Bill Clinton’s administration established Plan Colombia, which granted $1.3 billion in “emergency aid” to Colombia’s government to fight the “drug war.” [32]   This money has thus far purchased military hardware and financed the creation of three counternarcotics regiments that are currently operational. [33]   President George Bush expanded this plan, which is now designated the Andean Regional Initiative, to include a larger area of land and an additional $7.5 billion. [34]   The Colombian government says U.S. aid is not enough to effectively fight the “drug war.”  So, it has been speculated that they turn to a more steady income source, drugs.

Many deny the connection between Colombia’s government and the drug trade, especially officials in both Colombia and the U.S., but the majority of the Colombian people appear to be aware of the true situation.  The example of former President Ernesto Samper illuminates one case of a corrupt politician proclaiming a war on narcotics and then accepting money from that very industry in private.  Additionally, Raul Reyes, a leader among the FARC, claims that all Colombians are fully aware that “in Colombia drug trafficking is in the presidential campaigns and in Congress.  Many senior officers receive drug-trafficking money.  Much of the country’s economy is supported by drug-trafficking money; it is a reality of the Colombian economy.” [35]   Evidently, it is not at all the government who runs the country through representation, but rather drugs that determine the fate of all.

Who then are Betancourt’s true persecutors?  She speaks of a revolutionary transformation that must take place in Colombia for the country to be safe and prosper.  Thus, she points her finger at corruption, and sees politicians as the central problem.  Just like addressing the demand for drugs is more critical than fighting the production of drugs, so is identifying the source or support behind the violence in Colombia more important than countering those who execute it.  Betancourt has stood up against both those who inadvertently and directly shed the blood of the Colombian people.

She has taken a stand for a true democracy that actually represents the people, and peace.  She says in her memoir in reference to the warring factions of the country “it’s as if the political leaders and the guerrillas are helping each other along in order to maintain a state of war that suits them but is destroying our country.” [36]   Despite their differences, it is precisely in the light of Betancourt’s threat as a truth teller that all the warring factions have symbolically unified against her.  The FARC kidnapped her and nobody else is making a move to guarantee her release.  Her opposition to each has forced them to ally against her for their survival.  Without one another the truth may be recognized, corruption revealed and the system as it works today would most likely crumble.  Her sacrifice would scapegoat the truth and maintain the status quo.

The Victim

Cross-Cultural Signs of a Victim

René Girard, in his text, lays out general characteristics of sacrificial victims.  He claims that although it may appear random, in many cases victims are not arbitrarily chosen.  Rather, they carry signs of a victim that draws the attention of a mob to them.  He states that ethnic and religious minorities, people with some sort of illness or physical abnormality, those that are physically disabled or have a behavioral disorder and those who fit into extreme categories, like either the extremely wealthy or most impoverished, are the ones often targeted as victims. [37]  

Ingrid Betancourt typifies Girard’s stereotypes of a victim.  She belongs to the small elite population within Colombia.  Her family is financially, politically and socially successful.  She was born into a highly cultured family who mingled with many great Latin American artists, writers and diplomats.  As a little girl she would run around at parties her parents held for important Colombian political figures, and sometimes come across such a renowned international figure as Pablo Neruda. [38]   Her father was Colombia’s ambassador to UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization).  His work relocated the family, when Ingrid and her sister were quite young, to France.  It was in France where Ingrid spent most of her time as a child.  With brief interludes spent in Colombia, Ingrid completed the majority of her education, through her graduate studies in Political Science, abroad.

The world of Colombian politics surrounded Ingrid from a very young age.  As the daughter of the Colombian ambassador to UNESCO and a prominent social activist, her mother, Ingrid learned early on of the dishonesty that infiltrates the political sphere.  As is apparent, her history varies drastically from so many other Colombians. She came from a well off family, had a father and mother prominent on the political scene and never lived for an extended period in Colombia until she was twenty-nine. Thus, she fits quite well into Girard’s identification of a victim as one who occupies a polarized position.

It is additionally interesting to note that she is a woman in a culture and field dominated by men.  Ninety-five percent of Colombians are Roman Catholic, and traditional Catholic values identify men as superior to women.  Girard says there is a common attraction to women as victims of sacrifice, because both men and women alike perceive them as being of the weaker sex.  Thus, it is no surprise that Ingrid Betancourt as a woman in a Catholic country, challenging the very ethics of the men who run it, would be identified as hazardous.  Subsequently, it is not entirely unpredictable that they would then single her out, consciously or unconsciously, as a sacrificial victim.

It seems impossible that Betancourt does not see the vulnerable position in which she has placed herself.  She knows of the anger she inspires in her opponents.  She has received innumerable death threats to her person as well as others directed at her family, and witnessed many unsuccessful attempts to devastate her career.  She chose to make great sacrifices in her personal life, including giving up her children, to continue her political ambitions.  Why does she choose to continue the life of a Colombian politician and expose herself to harsh criticism and danger?  Is she striving to make a hero of herself as her accusers claim?  Or does she see that to truly end the chaos that plagues her country she must provoke it?

Girard employs the example of a Theban mythological god, Cadmus, who causes disorder in the interest of reconciliation.  Cadmus sees the evil players, the warriors, and simply has to throw a stone into the center of the crowd for each man to think another has provoked him.  Consequently, most of the men kill each other off while trying to identify the source of the provocation.  All they had to do to resolve the conflict was realize that Cadmus caused the commotion, and thus unify against him. [39]   With this story, Girard exemplifies his point that as long as a group believes in the guiltiness of a victim, proof is unnecessary.  However, he also brings to the surface and idea whose potential it’s not clear he’s fully aware of: that it may work to resolve differences with an implicit scapegoat.  Cadmus consciously caused disorder with the intention of establishing order.  Do persecutors have to consciously rally around a victim or can it be unconscious and successful as well?

Betancourt doesn’t need to cause any turmoil among her rivals, they have taken care of that part themselves.  However, with her accusations of all, particularly the politicians, participating in corrupt activities she ups the ante and increases tensions between the groups.  Hence, she aggravates the already existing conflicts.  By inflaming their hatred for one another she encourages the factions to take drastic measures against one another.  Such a method could aid Betancourt in getting rid of the enemies she attempted to drag confessions out of, but failed.  This would provide her with a clean slate from which to rebuild Colombian society.

Because of the unavoidable casualties that would result from such tactics, it is unlikely that Betancourt is using such a strategy.  Nevertheless, she could encourage conflict to a lesser extent with the idea that recognition of the myth that conceals corruption would result from the exertion of such pressure.  In this scenario she volunteers herself as the scapegoat, and risks the possibility of becoming a martyr.

An Obstacle

Betancourt, by becoming involved in Colombian politics, has consciously placed herself in the middle of an established system as an obstacle that will have to be overcome for the system to continue to function as it has.  She is a scandal in the way in which Girard uses the term: as someone or something that stands in the way of another fulfilling their desires.  To elaborate on this concept Girard draws on the example of John the Baptist.  He labels John the Baptist a scandal because he spoke the truth.  He uncovered a situation of corruption between Herod, his wife Herodias and his brother Herod.  Herodias was particularly attracted to and simultaneously infuriated by John’s inability to be corrupted.  Her desires to prove her authority over her husband lead to her demand for John the Baptist’s death.  Herodias thus scandalizes John the Baptist because he became the obstacle that she had to overcome to fulfill her desires. [40]

Betancourt is the obstacle which Colombian politicians have to overcome in order to maintain the fundamental myth that they are not corrupt.  She stands in the way of the guerrillas’, the paramilitary’s and the government’s ultimate desire, to be the most powerful.  One could extend the comparison further to show that part of why she has attracted politicians’ attention is because she speaks the truth and they are aware of it.  Their mimetic desire to follow her example because it seems to benefit her attracts them to her.  She also rejects them, and that response draws them in even more.  They hate her for standing in their way of fulfilling their desires, because they see truth in what she says and because her truth could ruin their goals and their dignity.  She is a scandal, a scapegoat and thus a victim.

A Substitute

One other significant way in which Ingrid Betancourt can be identified as a victim is by examining who and what she represents.  It is true that Betancourt suffers the charges brought against her from the opposition, she faces death threats and now has to endure being a hostage of the FARC facing an unknown future.  However, is she the one who looses the most in Colombia’s current, dreadful situation?

The people of Colombia are those who have no choice but to be paid assassins in order to make a enough money to survive, those who live daily fearing they may be one of the 30,000 deaths per year, [41] those who watch as family members are slaughtered, and those who get caught in the “drug war” because they need work and end up cultivating coca and poppy fields.  These are the real victims in Colombia’s civil war, and they are the one’s Ingrid Betancourt represents.

Applying Hubert and Mauss’ terminology to this case, one could infer that the sacrifier (the one who benefits from the sacrifice) is any of Colombia’s military factions, or all of them.  Each one has personal interests in releasing themselves from Betancourt’s borage of truth.  They have to silence her in order to keep their myths alive.  Who the sacrificer (the one who enacts the sacrifice and kills the victim) is in this case is unimportant.  It may result in being the FARC, but they wouldn’t particularly benefit from taking that specific action.  Betancourt is the sacrificed, the victim.  Like Hubert and Mauss demonstrate, for the scapegoat to accurately function the victim cannot be the thing the community is attempting to rid themselves of.  Rather, it must be a substitute.  The precise reason why sacrifice is such a successful way to solve conflict is because the victim merely represents that which is to be done away with.  The community consents and believes that the victim possesses, frequently through a ritual transformation, the qualities they want to exterminate.  Hence, through the murder of the altered victim conflict dissolves.

By identifying with the common people Betancourt is their representative.  In a democracy all the diplomats should represent the people.  However, this is not at all the case in Colombia.  Betancourt claims that her political motivation is to bring justice to those who suffer from Colombia’s incessant violence.  It appears as well that the common people believe in her.  This fact was illuminated when despite having no support in the official polling of votes during her senatorial campaign, she won convincingly with the most votes of any candidate.  When it really mattered the people came to support her.  Thus, she can truly be claimed as their representative.  Her suffering is the representation of their pain and sacrifice.

Does the Scapegoat Mechanism Still Work?

By allying themselves around a chosen victim, Betancourt, the FARC, the ELN, the paramilitaries, the drug traffickers and the government could benefit from her sacrifice and tame the conflict she incites.  However, the crucial question is if this sacrificial solution will bring about lasting peace.

Girard asserts that no, sacrifice does not complete its mission in this case.  He maintains that the world has come to a place in its evolution where the scapegoat mechanism no longer functions to create lasting solidarity.  The case of Colombia demonstrates his assertion.  Since the future is unknown, there is no way to make an absolute claim that Betancourt’s sacrifice would not work to unify the warring factions of Colombia.  Nonetheless, it is unlikely her death would alter their ideologies, and force them to examine their myths.  The myths that keep them enslaved to violence.  Such a drastic shift is exactly what is necessary to halt the slow ruin of the country.

The only plausible way Betancourt’s murder could affect the events in Colombia is if it were to attract a substantial amount of international attention.  Her disappearance has captivated a significant amount of media coverage, but not enough to allow for drastic change.  The country moves toward apocalyptic violence, and unless this violence becomes a personal threat to other international communities it’s doubtful any will interfere.  If the scapegoat mechanism is no longer effective in Colombia, is there any solution for this crime-ridden country?

            The one visible alternative is that which Ingrid Betancourt offers: to expose corruption and rebuild a “true” democracy.

A Ray of Light in a Sea of Darkness

Betancourt’s enemies move to use her as a scapegoat.  The FARC, the ELN, the national army, politicians and the paramilitaries all have individual reasons to want her out of the way.  She threatens to reveal the truth.  She proposes that corruption, particularly in the political sphere, allows the cycle of violence in Colombia to continue.   Furthermore, she suggests that the only way to rid Colombia of corruption is to tackle its source, drug money.  These claims directly threaten the myth that Colombia’s government is working in the interest of the people, and calls on the public to acknowledge, and thus destroy, this myth.  The vote for Colombians is not free.  In an article published following the congressional elections on March 10^th, a paramilitary commander, Salvatore Mancuso, said “we’re making recommendations to the people who to vote for.” [42]   They were “recommending” candidates by intimidating those they opposed into stepping down or murdering those particularly problematic.

The myth must be revealed.  If it is not, Colombia will continue to breakdown.  As Girard says, the world is at a pivotal moment, and it is up to the people to either choose to unveil the myth that the ruling factions in Colombia are working for the good of the people, or continue on its course towards total decimation.  Violence is strangling Colombia’s populace and the people are ready for change and peace.

            Colombia’s movement towards apocalyptic violence is particularly evident in current events.  The breakdown of peace talks between the FARC and the government, the murder of a senator two weeks ago, the increase in attacks on the country’s infrastructure by the guerrillas and the kidnapping of presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, all highlight this fact.  Colombia’s 38-year-old civil war has come to a head once again, and the time is ripe for drastic action to be taken to end the country’s pervading violence.

The kidnapping of Betancourt has brought an exceptional amount of international attention to the violence and human rights violations occurring every day in Colombia.  Her disappearance could possibly rally the international community around ending the country’s war.  However, as Girard points out, although such a sacrifice has succeeded in resolving conflict in the past, this method of scapegoating the problem does not work anymore.  It does not function any longer because its effects are not long-lasting.  Thus, the desired sacrifice of Betancourt would do nothing to resolutely bring an end to the incessant bloodshed in Colombia.  It is only the revelation of the myth perpetuating the violence that could plausibly provide resolution.  With the help of Girard’s model, one is able to see that the message that Betancourt is promoting: attack the source of the violence, corruption an drug money, and peace will prevail, is currently the most promising solution.

Bibliography

Betancourt, Ingrid.  Until Death Do Us Part: My Struggle to Reclaim Colombia.  New York: Harper Collins, 2002.

“Colombia Country Report.”  The Economist Intelligence Unit  (London, March 2002).

Fontain, Roger.  “Colombia’s Truth-Teller.”  The Washington Times (March 5, 2002).

<www.washtimes.com>

Forero, Juan.  “Colombian Rebels Step Up Attacks.”  The New York Times (March 4, 2002).

<www.nytimes.com>

-----.  “Colombian Voters Veer to the Right in Congressional Election.”  The New York Times (March 12, 2002).

<www.nytimes.com>

Girard, René.  The Scapegoat.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Gonzalez, Luis Enrique.  “Interview with Raul Reyes.”  Prensa Latina (July 20, 2001).

<www.farc-ep.org>

Hubert, Henri and Mauss, Marcel.  Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

McDermott, Jeremy.  “Democracy The Loser on Colombia’s Election Day.”  The Scotsman (March 11, 2002).

<news.scotsman.com>

-----.  “Colombia’s Most Powerful Rebels.”  BBC News (January 7, 2002).

<news.bbc.co.uk>

-----.  “Colombia’s Rebel Kidnappers.”  BBC News (January 7, 2002).

<news.bbc.co.uk>

-----.  “Colombia’s Growing Paramilitary Force.”  BBC News (January 7, 2002).

<news.bbc.co.uk>

Robles, Frances.  “Rebel Tactics Cause Concern.”  The Miami Herald (March 6, 2002).

<www.miami.com>

Safford, Frank and Palacios, Marco.  Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

No Authors

By Reuters. “Colombia Launches Drug Fight in Ex-Rebel Territory.” The New York Times (March 3, 2002).

<www.nytimes.com>

By Reuters.  “Colombia Rejects Rebel Demand to Free Guerrillas.”  The New York Times (February 27, 2002).

<www.nytimes.com>

Other Sites

<www2.swissinfo.org/sen/Swissinfo.html>

<www.colombiareport.org>

<famulus.msnbc.com>

<www.colombiatimes.com>

<www.elespectador.com>

<web.greens.org>

<www.guardian.co.uk>

<dfn.org/focus/colombia>

<www.latinnews.com>

<www.cnn.com>

<semana.terra.com.co>

>www.salon.com>

<www.ingridbetancourt.com>