By Scott Miles Bryan

ABSTRACT

Bryan, Scott Miles. "Funding Conservation with Bioprospection: A Comparative Study of Costa Rica’s INBio and Yellowstone National Park." The Colorado College. 2001. 161pp

Conservationists and government officials are currently working to find new ways to provide economic incentives for ecosystem preservation. Bioprospection, or the search for commercially valuable genetic and chemical information, may provide one such solution.  However, creating a market capable of creating private benefits and fostering conservation is a challenging task.   Specifically, this market requires biodiversity to enter a neoclassical economic system that promotes individual benefits and is subject to numerous market failures. This thesis explores the hypothesis that bioprospection challenges conservation efforts and threatens biodiversity. This occurs as conservationists inadequately address numerous questions concerning market regulation and market failure. The hypothesis is explored through an overview of applicable economic theory, the development of this market at the international level, and case studies of Costa Rica’s National Biodiversity Institute (INBio) and Yellowstone National Park. The paper ends with specific policy recommendations for each case study and the market in general.  The findings of this study suggest that a great deal of action is still needed if this market is going to be used as a conservation tool.  If nothing is done to alter the current market's approach, bioprospection will threaten biodiversity and efforts to conserve it.

Note:  The following summary consists of the complete document's introduction, a description of the chapters on economic theory and market creation, the entire analysis of the case studies, and the policy recommendations.  It is intended to be a shorter version of the paper that addresses some of the more important ideas raised in the paper.  To view the complete document, please send an e-mail message to s_milesbryan@hotmail.com  

SUMMARY

Bioprospection is the search for commercially valuable genetic information and chemical compounds derived from biodiversity. Such research collects samples in the field and analyzes them in a lab setting to find marketable uses. Bioprospection can lead to the development of new medicines, genetically altered agricultural crops, catalysts for industrial processes, and other products. The value of such research is growing as more information is gathered and the biotechnology industry develops. Furthermore, benefits from such research can include profits for private firms as well as cures to diseases and other inventions that stand to improve the human condition.

At the same time, bioprospection depends on conservation to preserve ecosystems that might hold the genetic and chemical information necessary for new inventions. Thus, a direct connection exists between bioprospection and conservation. Such research relies on the collection of thousands of samples to find a marketable use. To maximize research efficiency, firms and researchers conduct bioprospection where biodiversity is found in the greatest densities. Such levels often exist in national parks, lands occupied by indigenous peoples, private nature reserves, and countries in which geographical factors encourage biodiversity. Furthermore, natural features such as thermal pools, ocean vents, coral reefs, and forest floors with decaying material are just some of the sources of concentrated biodiversity on which bioprospectors focus when collecting samples. Yet, protected and healthy ecosystems are becoming scarce in a world with a growing population and economic pressures. Many conservationists are beginning to understand such challenges and are promoting the use of profits from bioprospection to fund conservation projects. The idea is to provide economic incentives to landowners and governments that encourage them to save, not destroy, biodiversity.

However, this model requires conservation to coexist with neoclassical economic forces that have historically been some of nature’s greatest enemies. The current market system promotes profit-oriented activity, not communal benefits such as conservation. Markets ultimately seek to maximize efficiency through minimizing production costs and maximizing profits. When publicly owned goods such as biodiversity and knowledge pertaining to it enter this system, they are privatized in order to create profits. Such a process could potentially threaten the support for conservation efforts as resources are preserved for private, not public, benefits. Recognizing the limits and opportunities related to traditional markets is crucial when creating policy pertaining to bioprospection in national parks.

Difficult challenges to the bioprospection market include creating property rights, the presence of imperfect information and monopolistic behavior, negotiating fair prices, valuing local knowledge, and using benefits in a way that can strengthen conservation. Thus, the bioprospection model may save existing biodiversity or it could allow economic interests to undermine people and ecosystems in source nations. Therefore, it is important to study this approach to conservation and examine its current market realities and what they may or may not hold for biodiversity. The hypothesis explored in this thesis is that the current bioprospection model will not strengthen conservation, but rather create new challenges and threats to biodiversity. On the contrary, if a market system is created that is highly regulated and encompasses values that extend beyond money and private benefits; bioprospection could be an effective tool for conservation. Though the likelihood of such innovation is small, the thesis will explore policy recommendations and concepts of Ecological Economics that could be utilized in transforming this market into a conservation tool.

This paper shows how some conservationists and bioprospection proponents are currently failing to understand several market realities and political questions that will directly impact this model for ecosystem preservation. The two case studies illustrate this point as well as how governing bodies and public agencies are not properly prepared or funded to adequately manage this market. Nor are they prepared to balance conservation ideals with the outcomes of market economics. If markets are to exist in national parks, there needs to be a high level of regulation, given the fragility of ecosystems and the fact that the resources are publicly owned. Without policy creation and effective enforcement, the model will fail to strengthen conservation efforts. Ultimately, several policy changes must be implemented if it is decided that the market is appropriate and is going to continue. The paper argues that many policy changes will be difficult given the fact that national park systems already struggle to manage existing markets and that source nations enter the market from a relatively weak position. The intention is not to call for an end to market economics due to the number of failures that may arise. Nor is it to call for an end to the use of biodiversity. The goal is to promote the establishment of markets capable of encompassing a diversity of values and promoting the use and protection of biological resources. The current model poses many threats to conservation and creates new dilemmas concerning society’s value for this resource.

The hypothesis is explored by discussing applicable economic theory, the market's creation, and the two case studies. Chapter III introduces the economic theories applicable to understanding the bioprospection market. It discusses the idea of economics and the field’s importance in making decisions regarding the use of biodiversity.  The notion of markets is explained and how they function and fail. This is relevant due to the number of market failures present in the current bioprospection market and lack of discussion concerning their correction.  Failures include the presence of public goods, imperfect information, monopolistic behavior, and negative externalities.  The chapter also introduces basic concepts in international trade and how this market is promoted as an economic development strategy in some biologically rich, yet economically poor, areas around the world. Then, the paper outlines the different strategies set forth by Neoclassical, Environmental, and Ecological Economists. The chapter ends with a final section that addresses the economics of knowledge. This serves as an important concept because knowledge pertaining to biodiversity is argued to be a global public good. Therefore, privatizing such information creates new challenges and may have adverse effects on future innovation. This is significant to the hypothesis because it suggests that patenting biodiversity will alter society's value for the resource and could be detrimental to conservation.  The chapter attempts to describe the complex nature of this market that is often overlooked or minimized by bioprospection's proponents.  

Chapter IV discusses the creation of the biodiversity market and how new policies, technological developments,  and changing social attitudes toward biodiversity have facilitated the market. The chapter discusses the significance of the Convention on Biological Diversity and Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Section of GATT.  These institutions are discussed in the context of how the intellectual commons are being closed and how policy is creating a market opportunity for firms.  The chapter then focuses on specific challenges in the market that officials and firms are struggling to address. The first is that of biopiracy, or the removal of biological resources or knowledge without prior consent from a source nation or community. This is a market failure that continues to occur on a regular basis and is extremely difficult to correct.  The next challenge is that of price and barriers to entry into the market. This introduces the difficulties that source nations or parks face when entering the market and negotiating a price. The final challenge is that of creating and using the benefits created from bioprospection. Many political questions remain unanswered in regards to the allocation of funds within a source nation. The chapter serves as an important introduction to the case studies because it outlines specific challenges and opportunities that exist in the market.

Chapters V and VI consist of the Costa Rica and Yellowstone Case Studies.  They were chosen because both Costa Rica's National Biodiversity Institute (INBio) and Yellowstone National Park have served as important models in the conservation movement.  Today, they are on the cutting edge of the bioprospection market and working to find new ways to promote biodiversity protection.  The case studies are important because they depict how this market is developing and what challenges may threaten conservation.  However, both examples display the inadequacy of public policy and market economics, which will cause bioprospection to threaten conservation efforts in the future. Furthermore, efforts to manage the market could also draw desperately needed resources from agencies that currently suffer from a lack of funding. This occurs because the benefit-sharing agreements in both case studies fail to cover the true costs of conservation and regulation.  Thus, the case studies are significant to the hypothesis, which states that the current bioprospection model will not strengthen conservation, but rather create new threats for biodiversity and the efforts to protect it. The primary threat is that unregulated markets can be detrimental to biodiversity and alter society’s value for natural resources.

A significant finding of both case studies is the inability of current public policy to effectively channel bioprospection funds back to source ecosystems. If this market is proven to be lucrative for source nations, several decisions must be made and priorities will need to be reassessed when allocating bioprospection revenues. It is unlikely that conservation will take precedence over education, health care, and other publicly funded services that need continued financial support. If bioprospection begins to produce revenues for source nations, several questions will evolve concerning the use of such funds. We cannot assume that the funds will go toward conservation because of the numerous political questions that will arise. Thus, bioprospection creates several issues concerning public policy that suggest that source nations pursuing this market as a conservation tool face many challenges.

Privatizing biological resources and knowledge pertaining to it is another action that will challenge conservation. The case studies show how the current intellectual property rights paradigm, when applied to biological information and organisms, can be detrimental to society’s values for biodiversity. A situation arises in which access to biological information is highly limited and consumers must pay monopolistic prices when purchasing products produced through bioprospection. The high level of privatization limits innovation because knowledge and biodiversity are both public goods. If a small number of people are able to access information and study certain organisms, the possibility of future innovation is reduced. Furthermore, patents on life may limit the number of values for biodiversity that may exist beyond monetary standards. Thus, privatizing biological-based goods and services can work against the ideals of conservation.

Some observers might suggest that this model would be justified if parks were to receive a price that covered the cost of conservation. If products are discovered and benefit-sharing agreements function properly, Costa Rica and Yellowstone stand to earn significant levels of needed revenue. Though the author suggests that efforts to create revenues and channel them back to ecosystems are often flawed, money cannot be the only factor by which bioprospection efforts are judged. Ignoring how revenues will be produced in the neoclassical model and focusing on the resulting financial benefits is insufficient. Monetary benefits will rely on the privatization of knowledge and resources, the creation of economies of scale through increasing the market size, and the pursuit of efficiency within the rules of a neoclassical market: all of which stand to threaten biodiversity and society’s view for this resource. Thus, the assertion that the market could be justified merely on the presence of monetary benefits cannot be made. The flaw lies in a market system that could potentially misuse the resource through privatization and overuse.

If a product is found that yields significant royalty payments to parks, it will be consumers who face the largest burden. They will be the ones who will pay federal taxes and entry fees to preserve the resources that firms seek to create private benefits from. The public subsidizes the production process when bioprospection firms are allowed access to publicly owned biodiversity for low prices. Without public contributions, federal funds and agencies would not exist to foster conservation. Additionally, a flawed patent system will force consumers to pay monopolistic prices for products. Thus, citizens in both case studies will carry the largest burden.

The case studies differ primarily because one occurs in a less developed country and the other is found in the context of a developed economy. Without investigation of either one, it would be possible to assume that the opportunity for public policy creation and enforcement would be greater in the United States. In addition, the U.S. has an advanced intellectual property right protection scheme and an experienced national park system. Hypothetically, the notion of effectively using the bioprospection market as a conservation tool is more realistic in the United States. However, this thesis argues that this assumption is not correct and that both case studies reveal similar challenges despite their differing levels of economic development. In fact, a less developed country such as Costa Rica and a large government bureaucracy in the United States such as the National Park Service enter the market from similar positions of weakness. Both are forced to desperately explore additional sources of revenue to maintain national park conservation. Therefore, they will not always be in a position to bargain for the highest royalty or access price. The figure on the following page exemplifies the similarities between the contracts signed in both case studies. This reflects their similar positions when entering the market.

COMPARING THE CASE STUDIES AT A GLANCE

Comparing the case studies brings us to conclude that the current bioprospection model fails to account for several of the challenges that exist concerning neoclassical markets and public policy. As a result, the current goal of using the bioprospection market as a conservation tool jeopardizes efforts to preserve fragile ecosystems. If this market is going to occur, the following policy recommendations are suggested in order to create a market that could coexist with conservation goals.

Policy Recommendations

Assessing bioprospection’s potential outcomes is a complex undertaking; one that is constantly transforming as firms make new agreements, social movements evolve, economic situations in source nations change, conservation strategies develop, and societies create new values for biodiversity. Thus, it is more appropriate to end with recommendations that set forth opinions rather than conclusions. Coming to an end in this debate is currently impossible because of the uncertainty involved in this market. We should avoid coming to conclusions to allow for creativity in the future. All too often, people argue that agreements between source nations and firms are as fair as the market will allow, or that there is nothing wrong with a firm trying to find cures for cancer and other diseases. Some conservationists suggest that selling nature is the only action that can save it, as we live in a world driven by economics. Such arguments bring us to simple conclusions and fail to see the true implications of applying a neoclassical market to conservation efforts. They close off the possibility of creating a new market system that is capable of including cultural and conservation minded values. Therefore, suggestions not conclusions are needed at this point in time.

Policy Recommendations for Costa Rica’s INBio

In many ways, INBio attracts firms because it is not a government agency and attempts to show how "free" economic forces can bring conservation. At the same time, INBio often places the responsibility for its own potential failure on the lack of government interest and market forces. Yet, it is INBio that is taking risks when it comes to placing biodiversity into the market. Many argue that such risks are necessary if conservation is going to continue. They might also argue that it is important to attempt to place economic values on these resources rather than let them remain outside of the economic system. Such ideas are supported by Garrett Hardin's argument to close the commons. Yet, uncertainties exist, and INBio often appears to be entering into a dangerous market situation in which Costa Rica will be unable to receive adequate benefits. INBio sees that there is a level of risk and danger involved, but works to shift the blame for its own failures. This institute should take responsibility to see that the information it generates enters a market situation in which the people of Costa Rica enjoy the greatest number of benefits.

INBio describes its bioprospection division as "exchanging," not "selling" biodiversity. This terminology implies that "exchanging" suggests a smaller level of responsibility. And thus, INBio may fail to oversee firms’ appropriate use of Costa Rican biodiversity and relevant knowledge. Furthermore, the idea of "exchanging" implies that INBio does not need to play as important of a role when it comes to distributing benefits. Yet, INBio brings biodiversity to the market and allows private firms to take ownership over patent rights for resources owned by the state. Though INBio claims not to "sell" anything, one could argue that the nation's biodiversity would not be a marketed commodity if the Institute were not in existence. This debate comes down to the interpretation of language and takes pressure off of the idea of a responsibility attached to the act of "selling."

After investigation in the field, the paper concludes that INBio has a monopoly on bioprospection efforts in Costa Rica and is more knowledgeable than the government regarding the use of biological resources. Thus, as the nation's expert in biodiversity, INBio needs to take an active role regarding the commodification of biological resources. If INBio wishes to continue bioprospection in Costa Rica, the Biodiversity Law is one of the first areas that must be strengthened. Many of the people interviewed discussed how the law lacks crucial elements concerning its application and enforcement. Furthermore, this law is not widely known by many government officials or biologists alike. The first example of a failure in the Law concerns the issue of patents. The Law does not sufficiently discuss how firms apply for patents in the United States. It is clear that patents play a vital role in firms' use of biodiversity and the law needs to address such property protections if private enterprise continues to show interest. These resources will not have economic values if patents do not exist. As long as INBio continues to promote working with firms, patents will be fundamental to attract such interests. Without adequate discussion, this nation's resources will be more vulnerable to exploitation.

At the same time, INBio must approach patents with more certainty and work to thoroughly understand the limitations of standard approaches to intellectual property rights protection. As discussed in the chapter concerning this market’s creation, patents work to limit the number of values that can exist for biodiversity. INBio stresses that it is not solely an institute for bioprospection, and works to find other uses for biodiversity. This division accounts for 15% of INBio's annual budget. However, as INBio works to transfer patents to firms, it limits the possibility for future uses. It is not unrealistic to imagine situations in which students are not allowed to research certain organisms, people are not allowed to write field guides, and local people are not allowed to use plants found on their own lands, without paying royalties to patent holders. Thus, the creation of a traditional patent system limits the number of uses in the future. Allowing the Biodiversity Law to create a standard patent system is potentially problematic. In such a situation, the TRIPs agreement allows nations like Costa Rica to develop alternative, or sui generis, models. Yet, such innovation must come from INBio, as the government is not currently involved.

The issue of benefits represents another problem to the Biodiversity Law. As discussed earlier, a series of political and legal debates may challenge INBio's current plan to allocate funds to the parks. Article 76 requires entities conducting bioprospection, including INBio, to give 10% of research budgets and 50% of royalties to the areas in which samples are collected. If an entity is working in a national park, these funds must go back to the park system. The same formula applies if such work is conducted on indigenous or private lands. As long as INBio continues to have a monopoly in bioprospection in Costa Rica, this article will only apply to the Institute. At the same time, INBio works for the public good and must develop foresight in areas in which the government is not involved. It is clear that Article 76 will politically and legally prove to be problematic. Furthermore, it does not address the issue of missing funds in the nation's central account and other errors in the system of giving money back to the parks. The model assumes that funds alone will create conservation and sustainable development. However, such outcomes will only occur when the Law sees beyond merely giving funds to the Parks.

If an economic interest in conservation is to be created, benefits must go beyond park boundaries. The funds could go to environmental education in public schools, or to address issues other than the environment that are needed for development. Indeed, INBio is working with the nation's school children, but there is not a national environmental education program that can function to change popular attitudes towards conservation. Reaching beyond the park boundaries is an important step towards sustainable development. Currently, INBio runs the risk of creating an economic interest in conservation that focuses on foreign firms more than on the people of Costa Rica. Such a situation will undermine sustainable development, as a long term and domestic interest in conservation is not established.

Regarding the issue of trust, INBio runs the same risks that a storeowner faces against shoplifting. Oftentimes, there is nothing the Institute can do but trust those who use its information. Costa Rica can only hope that firms will notify INBio about a "hit" and pay the agreed royalties. Such risks are taken in any transaction whether it is a "sale" or "exchange" of goods. The level of risk varies from the nature of the transaction. A car dealership might face a smaller level of risk as it sells goods that are rather large and can be located by the police. INBio faces a much higher risk, as it "exchanges" knowledge, chemical compounds, and genetic material. Such goods are difficult to identify where they go and how they are used after INBio transfers them to firms. This does not mean that INBio cannot enter the market. It means that it must develop a system to monitor the ultimate use of Costa Rica's biodiversity just as the car dealership might install security cameras. At present, INBio relies only on trust in a world of cutthroat capitalism and genetic information that can be concealed in small jars and manipulated through biotechnology. Thus, INBio stands to be extremely vulnerable if it does not form a system to monitor how its information and samples are used.

Policy Recommendations for Yellowstone National Park

If Park Service officials believe that bioprospection should be a source of revenue, several steps must be taken to go beyond covering the costs of conservation and access to the resource. The details of the Diversa CRADA reveal that the firm will pay $20,000 annually as a contract payment in addition to the contribution of training and future royalties. It is also known that a Park official will be assigned to oversee Diversa’s actions and enforce any policies. However, the agreed contribution of training and contract fees may not cover the cost of labor for Park officials to manage the agreement. In many ways, the Park is taking on a risk because it will not begin to be reimbursed until royalties are paid. Thus, the cost of managing this agreement could outweigh the market's benefits if royalties are not paid or products are not discovered.

Furthermore, bioprospection proponents must work to identify the political realties that may evolve and how the idea to pay for conservation could be jeopardized. If the law requires all park revenues to go to the central treasury, it is possible that the funds generated form bioprospection could go elsewhere. In such a scenario, the Park’s management will be further weakened due to an increase in services provided, combined with no change in additional funding. As a result, resource management would suffer and policy enforcement for bioprospection could be reduced. The final result could be detrimental to Yellowstone. Thus, it is critical that the Park identifies the political realities of this new market and works to keep at a level that covers costs and brings new benefits to the Park. If this cannot be done, the bioprospection market should be halted from future expansion.

Proponents of bioprospection in the Park cannot simply state that it is being conducted for the sake of science and that knowledge generated from this investigation will be an asset to the American people. They must be clear to officials and citizens that the current definition of science allows for the privatization and sale of knowledge. Such actions will have a profound impact on how our society values and uses the resources found in the National Park System. Firms conducting research will not simply provide knowledge without seeking a price to compensate itself and generate profits. The public subsidizes bioprospection through tax dollars and user fees that fund knowledge production needed for research. At the same time, the public will then have to pay high prices to access such information or knowledge-based products due to monopoly prices created by the patent system. Science is not only about the quest for knowledge. Additionally, a limited number of people can benefit from such investigation in today’s information-driven economy. Science must be viewed from a new perspective and public policy must do so as well.

Indirect biopiracy will continue as long as the Park does not draft CRADAs for all researchers in the Park. Researchers in both the public and private sectors must agree to work under the terms of profit sharing agreements, minimizing imperfect information and biopiracy. If Yellowstone wishes to benefit economically from the advancement of bioprospection, it must develop a system to manage the market that is capable of monitoring actions that occur both inside and outside the Park. However, a decentralized system may have limitations as the market grows and it could become inefficient. Yellowstone National Park will not be able to effectively manage this market on its own. The National Park Service, not individual parks, must implement and enforce policy.

Beth Burrows explains that if bioprospection were only about generating revenue for the Park, then officials failed miserably. From a purely economic sense, Burrows’ statement is an interesting assessment. If the American people are going to benefit from this market activity, the Park Service will need to consult the best intellectual property rights attorneys in the country, develop an advanced management scheme to minimize imperfect information, and take other measures to ensure the highest return. These steps were not taken in the Yellowstone-Diversa CRADA.

If bioprospection is going to continue to occur in Yellowstone National Park, the economic aspects must be identified and effectively managed. However, the National Park Service enters this market from a position of weakness, because it currently struggles to carry out its mission in an era with limited budgets. The level of complexity with which the Park will be able to manage this market is low, when compared to that of today’s profit–driven science.

Recommendations for the Current Bioprospection Model

An example of a positive externality is a professional pianist who practices with his windows open and his neighbors listen from outside. The practice is carried out to enhance the performance that listeners will pay to hear in an auditorium. It is not conducted for the benefit of a third party. There is no obligation for the pianist to keep playing or to leave the windows open. Thus, the neighbors cannot expect for the music to continue. The same is true for any positive externality as there is no incentive for the activity to continue to provide benefits to a third party free of charge. It is insufficient to assume that positive externalities on third parties can be sustained over a period of time.

If anything, conservation through the current bioprospection model can only be a brief concert, not a endless ballad. If the goal is continued, people need to include other values and avoid focusing on merely applying a neoclassical market. In such a model, conservation relies on firms who will seek efficiency more than anything else. They will move to where labor is the least expensive and bioprospection is most efficient. Such an occurrence is a current market reality that proponents of bioprospection often fail to consider.

The market approach has other dangerous flaws which indicate that conservation will be challenged by the reality of neoclassical market forces. Benefits are vital to the process of creating incentives for conservation. However, they depend on the price and nature of contracts negotiated between source areas and firms. At the moment, firms are only willing to pay for costs associated with labor. The notion of paying additional prices to cover the cost of conservation and reimbursing sources of local knowledge is not a realistic expectation in the current model. Negotiating prices will become more difficult in the future, as more biologically rich countries enter the market and create formal institutions such as INBio. With time, the supply of bioprospection services and labor will increase. This will bring a decline in prices as more suppliers compete for contracts. Such a decline will solidify the notion that price can only include labor and research costs and that other values cannot exist inside of the market. As the price goes down, it will be increasingly difficult for bioprospection to pay for conservation. In turn, firms will have to recognize why prices must reflect traditionally unvalued factors in order to protect potential source ecosystems for new products. As long as limited prices exist, it will become increasingly difficult to pay for conservation. Thus, we need to create a new market system capable of including other values and concerns.

If a market system is going to be developed for bioprospection, it will depend on the responsibility and foresight of source nations and firms alike. Both the TRIPs and CBD agreements give nations the option to create alternatives to private intellectual property rights and allow for the establishment of more complex systems of sharing benefits. However, these notions rely on the political climates within nations and the responsibility of firms and intermediaries in the market. Thus, society has the option to seek alternatives as long as we look beyond dominant economic and scientific models. This is our only hope if we want to develop sustainable conservation efforts that include the people who live in close proximity to source ecosystems.

Such a downfall can be seen in the following example of the American Bison. In David Takacs' The Idea of Biodiversity, he explains the concept of using nature to save itself through a series of examples and quotes from biologists and conservationists. One quote relates to the American Bison, and how creating a market for its meat helped save this species that was once on the brink of extinction. Tackacs quotes the director of the American Bison Association as saying "Animals that people eat do not go extinct." This point is arguably true and serves as an important idea in favor of the idea of using nature in order to conserve it. However, further examination of this example uncovers a different reality. Indeed, creating markets for Bison meat helped allow humans to save this species. However, that is precisely the problem. It is one species. Today's modern conservation management and economic systems are more capable of saving individual species rather than ecosystems and larger functioning units of biodiversity. Clearly, bison are still living in the American West. Yet, how many native grasses that these animals once depended on still survive? How many vitamins and hormones are injected into bison to help them endure their artificial existence? What kind of genetic diversity exists within this species? The answers suggest that markets are unable to address ecosystems on a whole.

Accordingly, bioprospection that is capable of conserving biodiversity is an important challenge. Applying a neoclassical market to a pluralistic idea such as biodiversity relies on reductionist biology and a patent system to remove organisms from their ecosystems. Thus, traditional markets work against ecological concepts, as biodiversity is a complex and interdependent system. The notion of isolating individual organisms from their native ecosystems, and ignoring indigenous and local values, poses a threat to biodiversity, rather than as a method to save it. Limiting the number of values for biodiversity ultimately challenges efforts to create a sustained interest in conservation. Privatizing this resource may act to establish a situation in which only a narrow system of values can exist. This would make society's value for biodiversity even more susceptible to failure than it already is.

Looking to the Future

Almost all of these recommendations call for greater responsibility and more creative discussion if bioprospection is going to pay for conservation. They depict a situation in which firms and intermediaries fail to take adequate responsibility for their actions. Furthermore, such entities lack the more sophisticated foresight that goes beyond the short term, which is required for this model to work. Such downfalls occur as entities involved neglect to look beyond their own interests and specialties. Thus, the current situation presents a case in which narrowly focused strategies characterize the decision-making processes.

Such compartmentalization within science, economics, and social movements alike represents a challenge that must be overcome if we are to view this debate on broader terms. In their quest for efficiency, firms, research institutions like INBio, and national parks create independent divisions that are often isolated from other projects. At the same time, employees are constantly transferred from one department to another and not allowed to see the complete process. As a result, few people know who should take responsibility or what the true implications of their actions might be. Yet, such compartmentalization does not only occur behind the doors of corporate laboratories.

Social movements are also guilty of compartmentalizing their efforts as they focus on specific agendas. Examples include conservationists' failure to recognize the peoples and cultures that live with biodiversity. Another example occurs when indigenous rights groups charge INBio's parataxonomist program with exploiting indigenous knowledge. They often fail to recognize that campesinos, or people from rural areas, have similar knowledge of biodiversity and can also be exploited. Thus, compartmentalization can force firms, research institutions, and social movements to take narrow positions that work against creativity, equity, and diversity.

Compartmentalization is perhaps the largest challenge that we as a society must face if we are going to preserve the world's biological resources in a way that allows a diversity of values to exist for ecosystems. Our current approach to conservation is too individualistic and fails to include a number of perspectives. We seem to be working against the goals of ecological conservation in our compartmentalized approach to science, economics, and social issues. Biodiversity is a pluralistic concept and its preservation relies on recognizing multiple values and uses. Conservation that utilizes bioprospection and neoclassical markets fails to address such complexities and creates an oversimplified solution.

Examining the current market in the Costa Rica and Yellowstone case studies reveals significant information in relation to the hypothesis. The current bioprospection model will not strengthen conservation, but rather create new threats for biodiversity and the efforts to protect it. The assumption that a neoclassical model can coexist with conservation is an oversimplified solution to financing poorly funded park systems. The current approach fails to consider many existing political realties, the need for regulation, the impact of patenting biodiversity on our view towards biodiversity, and how neoclassical markets challenge the ideals of ecology. The case studies reveal the need to drastically alter this market-based approach if it is going to occur in national parks. However, local governments, firms, and NGOs lack the information and ability to effectively create a new market paradigm capable of conserving ecosystems. Such solutions will depend on more collaborative and creative discussion that must take place outside of a compartmentalized environment. Until a new market model is created, the current bioprospection paradigm will continue to threaten biodiversity and conservation efforts.

Solving the numerous market failures and moving beyond a compartmentalized approach is a large task that requires time, funding, and creative thought. The policy recommendations mentioned earlier in this thesis describe how source nations can position themselves in the market. On a broader level, there are possible solutions that could begin to create a situation in which markets and conservation can coexist. Efforts need to focus on making companies more accountable and shifting the burden of regulation from poorly funded government agencies to firms.

Imposing taxes aimed to create funding for market regulation is one such solution. A bioprospection tax could create funding to be channeled to regulation efforts at the national and international levels. A framework of institutions such as the World Intellectual Property Organization, national patent offices, and natural resource management agencies in source nations already exists. Providing them with the necessary funding and more innovative policies toward biological-based knowledge and inventions could create an effective management scheme. Standards must be consistent and policies must be aimed at creating a market that fosters conservation, accounts for new values, and allows for continued innovation. Thus, alternatives exist that could create a bioprospection market capable of fostering conservation.