Copeland - Colorado College

Morgan Stempf
2003

MOSCOW, Russia (CNN) -- A loud explosion has been heard near the Moscow theatre where an estimated 40 to 50 armed hostage-takers demanding an end to the war in Chechnya have taken up to 700 people hostage.

October 12, 2002¹

The ongoing civil war between the semi-autonomous republic of Chechnya and Russia has dramatically caught the attention of the world – a world that perceives the conflict primarily through the distorted lens of Russian propaganda, and the contradicting images of Chechen suffering on the independent media. If the West seems impartial or even indifferent to the Chechen conflict, it is because there is little understanding of this people, of their struggle, or of the vast complexities of the greater North Caucasian region in which the Chechens are a part. This lack of understanding extends to the hazy Western perception of the role of Islam in Chechen society. The broad generalizations that have been made by those in the media, by aid organizations, by the Russians, by Islamic groups, and by those in the American government are all politicized oversimplifications which seek to bring the core of the conflict to its lowest common denominator. Many of the claims revolve around Islam; yet, few bother to take into account the greater character of Chechen society, or of the broader historical scope of change that Islam has followed in Chechnya. Often, Islam has changed in response to a Russian stimulus, but many of the Russian actions and reasons in this conflict are well documented. This study aims to analyze the Chechen role in the civil war – and the role of Islam in Chechnya – as opposed to the Russian role, which has been analyzed many times over.

 The North Caucasus

It is difficult for Englishmen to take an intelligent interest in the internal affairs of Russia, owing to the vast number of problems involved, all of which depend upon varying local circumstances, and because comparatively few of us, even as tourists, know the country, and fewer still can speak or read the Russian language.

Luigi Villari in his Book Review, The Frosty Caucasus, 1904²

Not much has changed. As Villari states, linguistic difficulties were a major problem in studying Eurasia at the turn of the century. Today, the task of studying the six North Caucasian states is complicated by the several dialects of the Nakh language (one of which the Chechens speak), as well as the Batsbii and Ingush languages. In many cases – as in the Chechen and Ingush peoples – one dialect of Nakh is more closely related to the Ingush language than of other Nakh dialects (the Chechens and Ingush share forty percent of their vocabulary). Furthermore, the Chechens themselves lacked a written script until the 1920’s. Up until that time the only literacy was of a few men who could read the Arabic Koran; and therefore the only collective histories were oral, increasing the reliance of the historian upon the Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Russian accounts of their encounters with the Chechens.

 Map of North Caucasus, Russia, Chechnya³

Despite the linguistic differences, there is a great cultural unity among the North

Caucasians – probably because not one ethnic group is more than a million persons in size. They are a peoples defined mostly by the mountainous region that has insulated them from the invasive cultures of the Arabs, Turks, Persians, Mongols and Russians – even through the modern times. They share commonalities of dress, custom, dwelling, food, hospitality, and of a strong sense of the inherited tribal structure. In the seventeenth century, Islam also became the dominant religion of the region, due to the efforts of Turkish missionaries. While usually not adhering to any strict sense of Islam as a modern Turk or Iranian would recognize it, they incorporated their interpretation of Sufism into their pre-Islamic traditions. Their Islamic identity gradually became defined through the need to distinguish themselves more clearly from the Orthodox Russians.

The Chechens themselves are somewhat different from the rest of the North Caucasians in their degree of militancy and ‘wildness.’ They have a strong attachment to their weapons and place high value on masculinity in the defense of their families as well as the greater ‘nation’ of Chechnya. Chechens are still often buried with their weapons, including their person kinjal (dagger), of which their reluctance to separate from is legendary. As a result of this masculine pomp and swagger, the blood feud is a pervasive trait in the region and has been exacerbated by the violent political divisions within the modern society. It has led to the de facto barring of any successful unified law other than an unspoken code of conduct; morals are held in check by the family, not the society. It has led to what onlookers describe as “ordered anarchy.” ⁴ On the other hand, the tribal unit has paradoxically prevented quarrelling Chechens from resorting to physical confrontation in the fears of sparking a feud; instead, it has cultivated an ideal of militant showmanship and bravado often written about by awestruck Russian soldiers amazed to see flashy displays of Chechen horsemanship in the line of fire during the early conflicts. This haughty individualism, as well as the society’s dependence on the familial structure, has prevented a unified, hierarchical political structure from ever being established. It has therefore made the Chechens notoriously difficult to conquer, as there has never been a collective establishment that a foreign power could simply take command of. As a result, the Chechens are a famously nationalistic, resistive, and therefore militant people. This political structure’s oscillation between peace and wartime is delineated by Russian anthropologist Sergi Arutiunov:

Chechnya was and is a society of military democracy. Chechnya never had any kings, emirs, princes or barons. Unlike other Caucasian nations, there was never feudalism in Chechnya. Traditionally, it was governed by a council of elders on the basis of consensus, but like all military democracies – like the Iroquois in America of the Zulu in southern Africa – Chechens retain the institution of military chief. In peacetime, they recognize no sovereign authority and may be fragmented into a hundred rival clans. However, in time of danger, when faced with aggression, the rival clans unite and elect a military leader. This leader may be known to everyone as an unpleasant personality, but is elected nonetheless for being a good general. While the war is on, this leader is obeyed. ⁵

As a result of their fierce independence, the small Chechen population (957,000 by the 1989 census) has distinguished itself from the other North Caucus states in its refusal to submit to the Russian Bear.

In the modern era, Russia has made a great deal out of the “fundamentalist” and “terrorist” aspect of the Chechen resistance. This serves to placate the west and its perception of Chechnya as a veritable nest of human rights abuses by demeaning the Chechen actions to the level of “terrorism.” This loaded term implies a certain degree of irrationality, accompanied by a destabilizing political violence which is both uncivil and inhumane; in this light, it is acceptable to mete out a harsh and deterrent punishment to these “terrorists.” The use of the term also implies a people who are misguided or brainwashed into acts that lack circumspection. This generalization of the Chechen people plays to the domestic ethnocentricity of the Russians and simplifies the political equation by placing all the Chechens in the category of “fundamentalist.” The Chechen irrationality points to a primitive nature that limits the validity of their claims for independence; that the Chechens are too immature to possess the concept of “nationalism.” But how true is it, that all Chechens are motivated by a radical Islamic ideology? To analyze this question, one must go back to the beginning of the Chechen struggle against the Tsarist regimes and look at how the role of Islam began, and how it has changed over time to its current position in Chechen society.

The Chechen Sufi Identity: The Revolts of Sheikh Mansur and Sheikh Shamil

 In the late eighteenth century, Sufism became more than a superficial following with the advent of the Naqshbandi order, a Sunni following that became prevalent in the North Caucasus. This coincided with the invasion by Catherine II who was seeking to expand her empire to the protective barrier of Caucasian mountains that split the Black and Caspian Seas. The response was of a North Caucasian unity unforeseen by Russians who, in 1785, viewed the area as primitive and tribal. Their leader was Sheikh Mansur, a Sufi religious leader that advocated a unified Islamic state of the North Caucasian peoples under the shariah. The members of his order spread the ideas of asceticism and ghazi warfare against the invaders, as well as the overthrow of prevalent tribal laws. After several great victories in the Caucasian mountains, he was captured five years after the beginning of his resistance. His success was in the temporary creation of a state combining present day Daghestan and Chechnya, and in creating a tradition of resistance against invading Russian forces.

The greatest Sufi master to lead the Chechens was Sheikh Shamil (sometimes spelled, Shamyl) who was actually a Daghestani by birth. He rose against the Cossack settlers from Russia who had come to the Terek plain of Northern Chechnya since the 1600’s, and were growing quickly in numbers. The Tsarist army tried to quell Shamil’s “revolt,” but for thirty years he was able to conduct a guerrilla warfare based in the mountains, and the thick, primeval forests of the steppes above Terek. Lieven has commented on Shamil:

Basing his rule theologically on Islamic law, and practically on the ability of his Murid-Led forces to terrorise backsliders and traitors, Shamil did his best to create a functioning Islamic administration, through a system of ‘naibs’, or local governors, ruling on the basis of the Shariah. From first to last, however, Shamil’s rule remained intensely personal, and he was plagued by the dubious, loyalty of many of the regions and clans following him. Often, control could only be maintained by savage reprisals and hostage-taking – for example, in his relations with the Avarkhans, which involved numerous murders and led to the ultimate defection of his ally, Haji Murat. ⁶

This passage reveals much about the character of Shamil who has been the object of considerable historical debate since his capture in 1859. His revival of the Naqshbandi order of the ‘Sabres of Paradise’ was known to the Russians as Müridism, or, warrior monks, is idealized by all Chechen nationalists today. Likewise, he is vilified by most Russians who would view his brutality as both a precedent, and a continuity for the harshness of modern Chechen rebels. In one interview with a Russian Chechen conflict veteran, he was asked whether it was just Russian soldier who were cruel:

The brutality of the modern Chechen conflict certainly stems back to this era of hostilities, and even if the above view is somewhat racist it does point to the perception among Russians that the Chechens were, and continue to be, a wild and ruthless people. Shamil himself was known for massacring Russian prisoners of war in retaliation for attacks, but usually he traded Russians for Chechen prisoners of war – still the norm for Chechen units. He formalized the Chechen practice of taking “hostages” ⁸ from the Russians, the Cossacks, or the Georgians in return for ransom money, and again, this is a continuity. Shamil’s harsh reprisals for “backsliders and traitors” is evident of a master practitioner of real politick, at least as much as he was a master Sufi. He was renowned for sensing who would be coming to see him before their arrival was announced – although this was attributed to his mystical connection with God, it was actually skilled deployment of numerous sentinels and secret police.

Shamil can be credited for giving Chechens their first taste of a central government, and their best model for resistance. But how ‘Islamic’ in nature was the resistance? Certainly Shamil was a devout believer, as were his followers, but their war was not in the name of jihad for Allah, or for social change, but rather to protect their way of life.⁹ Islam was used insofar as to reinforce the arrogance of a people who now felt that they were chosen by God; that masculine sense of superiority had never been threatened by any concept of civilizations more powerful than they. The Chechens were a people completely indigenous to that specific region and had lived their independently for thousands of years. While there is little analysis on the cultural impact of Islam during this period (because of the historical obstacles outlined in the first section), a number of generalizations can be made.

First, religion played the role of one of the many identities that the Chechens had – whether they were Caucasians, Tribes, or Muslims was of little matter – at their core they were first and foremost a people with a history of independence. They were relatively unaware of the massive political forces that were outside of their protective mountains and so were unafraid to confront them. With no real concept of a unified political structure, they were particularly unwilling to ever have it imposed by a foreign power. This created a culture that placed high value on militancy, and one which was not necessarily contradictory to their Islamic identity. Because their pre-Islamic culture and custom was pervasive at all levels of society (and had been relatively unchanged for hundreds of years), it probably had a more significant impact on Islam than Islam had on it. If Islam had turned the Chechens into militants, then why did not the other thirty-odd ethnicities of the Caucasus become more active in resistance (the Chechens, and to a lesser extent, the neighboring Ingush and Daghestanis were the only peoples to revolt)? The difference at this point was not Islam, but it was the nature of the Chechen people.

The influence of Islam can’t be overly downplayed; however, the radical, ascetic Sufism that became increasingly popular was successful because it preached resistance to the Russians. Sufism really went hand in hand with the Chechen’s cultural particulars. The belief in a people chosen and distinct from the Russians suited their battle against far superior forces. Also, pre-Islamic Chechens often formed ‘warrior brotherhoods’ that were based on similar ideas as the Mürids: seclusion from ones’ community in preparation for battle. In conclusion, it seems that the Chechens used the Sufi ideology for their own purposes of resistance, but that they may have used equally as well another ideology for defense, if they had needed one at all:

At first sight, many young Chechen fighters appear – and would certainly like to appear – as Homeric heroes, Achilles with a rocket-propelled grenade. It shows in their love of personal display – especially in clothes – their boasting and general swagger, their impatience with formal discipline… [But] Rather than archaic Greek heroes, the Chechens are classical Greek hoplites, held in the line of battle not just by loyalty to the polis, but by ties of family and neighborhood to the next man in the line – and held there very firmly indeed.¹⁰

In response to this indomitable spirit, the tsarist regime responded by deporting as many Chechens as they could – eventually 105,000 were relocated to the Ottoman Empire, or about 20% of the population.¹¹ Despite the Tsarist efforts, the pacification of Chechnya was far from complete. Their attempts to suppress a new Sufi brotherhood, the Qadiriya, were unsuccessful in that it turned a pacifist sect into a rebellious one. The Qadiri movement was singled out for their vocal expression of dhikr, rather than the quiet expression of the Naqshbandi – the Naqshbandi meanwhile, had penetrated neighboring (and ethnically similar) Daghestan and revolt began there in 1877. Future revolts in Chechnya would originate from the Qadiri movement, although both Sufi sects became equally predominant in the two societies.

Soviet Control and the Modern Conflict

 At the turn of the century, the Chechens divided between Chermoev’s Union of the Mountain Peoples, which was a nationalist and liberal attempt at organizing the greater North Caucasians into a mutual pact for independence, and the Sufi leaders of the mountain Chechens. While never openly hostile, the Sufis prevailed in an unlikely alliance with the Bolsheviks against the invasive White Army, while the Union of Mountain Peoples suffered a string of crushing military losses at the hands of the Cossacks, General Denikin of the White Army, the British forces, as well as the Bolsheviks. The promises of autonomous rule made by the Bolsheviks went unrealized; however, at the end of the Civil War the Bolshevik communists brought in a massive number of new Russian members in order to strengthen its hold on the population. This simple and egalitarian communist was familiar to political violence, and whose nationalism was hostile to ethnic diversity. As Mid East lecturer Bülent Gökay writes:

When the 11th Red Army coming from the north reached Daghestan and was marching towards Baku, it was at first greeted by red flags in the villages and auls of the North Caucasus. However, the arrival of the Red Army was accompanied by an influx of Russian communists who applied the harsh tactics of War Communism: attacks on the patriarchal traditions of Islam, punitive raids, confiscation of food supplies and forced conscription into Red regiments, requisitioning and the destruction of small-scale trading. These measures naturally antagonized the local people and provided a natural base of support for the rebellion.¹²

To abbreviate over the huge amount of historical intricacies: the following period is one of Soviet oppression of the Chechens as an ethnic minority, and as a Muslim society. The bitterest struggle was from 1920-1, in which Stalin was forced to compromise with the Sufi rebels. Between this time and the end of World War II, the communist party could not make a real presence in Chechnya, and so party purges and secret police kept the population in fear – thousands disappeared or were arrested. Sporadic violence broke out against the Soviet policy of religious repression – anything Muslim – waqfs (religious endowments), mosques, and the practice of preaching were outlawed. Religion was driven underground, and it is estimated that there was an Imam and “study group” for every community in Chechnya (while impossible to know exact numbers, there were at least 2,000 unsanctioned mosques), while there were only four legal (and state-controlled) mosques in the nation.¹³ The Soviets controlled the North Caucasian Muslims through the Central Asian Spiritual Directorate of Muslims (SADUM), using such measures as limiting religious education.

Finally at the end of World War II (1944), Stalin deported the Chechens on the flimsy basis that some Chechens had collaborated with Germans. In reality he was inflicting his own revenge against their anti-Russian struggle through a policy of ethnic cleansing. It was enacted against various other ethnicities (such as the Ingushes, Karachays, Balkars, Volga Germans, etc.) as well.

A total of 800,000 seems reasonable out of which probably 20 to 30 per cent disappeared during transportation. They were settled in the most forbidding areas of Siberia, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, and an unknown number were sent to various death camps.¹⁴

The atrocious conditions in which the Chechens were met in their new environment had three effects: first, the resettlement of Groznyy (Chechen capital) by Russian oil opportunists; second, the enormous loss of life and the enormous suffering and humiliation became the reference point to which all later Chechen generations would define their struggle; last, the strengthening and formalizing of Sufi religious traditions.

According to all recent Soviet sources, North Caucasians, especially the Chechens, are the most religious of all Soviet Muslims. Soviet sources are forced to admit that this militant religious spirit was fostered by deportation. Islam, in its most conservative form, became for the exiles deprived of their national rights and threatened by genocide the only basis of identity.¹⁵

It was not until 1958 that over 90 percent of all forcibly deported people had permanent housing.¹⁶ Despite the huge death rates due to disease, cold, malnutrition and famine, and Soviet brutality, this conservative form of Islam was not the most radical that the Soviets would see. From this point onward the Chechens defined themselves both in nationalist terms of a people, and as Muslims – two identities that are intrinsically linked, and whose cultural effects can longer be discernibly separated and pointed to as either “Islamic” or “non-Islamic” factors. However, this does not necessary preclude a radical brand of Islamism.

Post-Soviet Era

 In 1956, Khrushchev began his systematic campaign of ‘de-Stalinization,’ and the remaining Chechens were allowed a “right of return.” In many cases this process was not worked out smoothly, and in Groznyy itself there were race riots by Russian settlers against the Chechens. The slow return eventually led to the emigration of the Russians back into Russia and the overtaking of urban centers by the growing Chechen population in 1989; yet, in Chechnya today, there are still more Chechens in the countryside than in the urban centers. This traditional lifestyle was not changed very much against the backdrop of increasing modernization – Islam remained a primary tenant in Chechen society.

During the period of Glasnost and Perestroika under Gorbachev, the Chechen intelligentsia (that had a closer affinity to the secular, Soviet intellectuals than with the mostly conservative and pious, Chechen society) jumped on the liberal reformation bandwagon, and in 1990 appointed the Pan-National Congress of the Chechen People (OKChN). Its program was initially to raise the status of Chechno-Insgushetia (a people of such ethnic similarity, that they were paired in statehood after their joint return from exile) from an Autonomous Republic to the level of Union Republic. After the influential speech given by Azerbaijani People’s Deputy, Heydar Aliyev,¹⁷ the OKChN declared Chechnya a sovereign state – a desire for a political alliance with Moscow against the Ossentian state prevented the Ingush from joining the Chechens in their declaration. In the putsch of August 1991, the acting president of the OKChN was on the wrong side of the axe, and he was overthrown by Dudaev, a former Soviet General whose volatile personality and tragic political failures quickly narrowed the available directions of Chechnya. The OKChN was declared illegal by Moscow, and Dudaev quickly expelled the Russian puppets and was elected President.

His initial refusal to compromise and the personal insults he flung at Yeltsin and the Russian ambassadors quickly eroded his position in a political structure where individual personalities supercede that of political organization or institution. The stalemate led to three rival clans, alternately funded by the Russian Secret Services (FSB), attacking the secular government of Dudaev. He was forced to dismiss the parliament in an anti-democratic power play, but one that had popular support; the three opposition clans were marred by their relations to Russian mafia groups.

The mounting frustrations came to ahead in 1994 when a failed attempt by the FSB to directly assassinate Dudaev lead to an all-out assault on Groznyy by the Russian military. Other causes of the war to be considered are the importance of the oil reserves in Chechnya; the desire of the military to win a “small, quick victory”¹⁸ to regain funding and prestige; the fear of a ‘domino effect’ whereby one seceding nation leads to a slew of other rebellions; and the x-factor of internal Soviet politics, where central power struggles and economic gains are manifested in external conflicts and exploitative endeavors. This x-factor becomes more important in the second civil war.

Ironically, the very reforms that the Soviets advocated during this period of openness and reform were disallowed of the Chechens – directly leading to the formation of the radical Islamist groups. Chechens who had fought in Afghanistan were fighting amongst the average Chechen rebel and were beginning to expound radical ideologies – however, it wasn’t yet the overriding doctrine of resistance that it would become. Another emerging radicalized, yet distinct element were the Wahhabis from Saudi Arabi. They were moving into Chechnya to fight jihad, and although the Chechens were ideologically disparate from these radicals, they accepted them because of the great financial aid they gave.

In the political arena, Dudaev made the mistake of giving the Islamists avenues of power:

Dudayev really began to shift on this [position towards political Islam] in 1993, as his regime came under heavey ‘traditional’, religiously sanctioned ‘council of elders’ to provide a façade of democracy and popular legitimacy. However it was only with the autumn of 1994, and the imminent threat of war, that the rhetoric of political Islam became insistent – even then, it was I felt overwhelmingly a symbol and expression of national feeling rather than a detailed programme in its own right.¹⁹

Dudaev died at the end of the war in a missile attack, and his failure to bring a successful, secular democracy created a vortex of power, where the conservative Islamists filled in. A broad Islamic revival that had grown in power over the last two decades had finally gained political power in the presidential successor of Yandarbiev, who is credited with convincing Dudaev to attempt a partial conversion of Chechnya to shariah law (officially implemented under current president Maskhadov).²⁰

Unfortunately, the Islamic ideology that was so successful in fermenting resistance provided little real political solutions; Maskhadov himself was incapable of controlling the radical groups. Under the leadership of Jordanian born Khattab, and of Daghestani Shamil Basayev, the uncomfortable truce of 1996 was broken by an invasion into Daghestan by the radical separatist Daghestani Liberation Movement, in the name of “liberating” Daghestan from Russia and creating an Islamic state. They were surprised at their rejection by the common Daghestanis and Chechens alike, and were forced to retreat into hiding at Groznyy. These radicals were later proven to have financial support from the FSB, as well as from oil barons seeking to raise international oil prices. Maskhadov later laments in an interview with Novaya Gazeta:

This was a case of direct collusion between the Yeltsin administration, the financial oligarchy, Berezovsky, and the armed forces, who had shamefully lost that [first civil] war. It did not, of course, happen without the participation of short-sighted, radical-minded people from our side – I do not deny this. I was categorically opposed to the actions they mounted, and I wanted to stop them at any cost. I even went to the Russian leadership, and to the leadership of Dagestan. Unfortunately, I was not successful…²¹

Whereas the first war ended with the Russian realization that victory could only be had in genocide (already 80,000 Chechen civilians and soldiers, and 20,000 Russian soldiers had perished in the conflict). The second war was continued by Putin on the grounds of suppressing fundamentalism; he vowed that the “terrorists” would be “wasted in a shithouse.”²² Here we see the incredible polarity that a small section of radicalized Chechens had created – the vast majority of Chechens did not support the agenda of either the Wahhabis or the Sufi mujtahid. The Russian press was now calling for the blood of the “terrorists” Khattab and Maskhadov, despite Maskhadov’s attempts at diplomacy with the Russians, and of eliminating the domestic radicals. The Russian soldiers and the common Chechens quickly became the victims of a bloody battle between vague enemies and with unclear objectives.²³ There are casualties every day in this ongoing conflict, but a Russian media blackout and rebel violence has virtually cut off all independent media from accessing Chechnya.

No compromises can be made in the present air of hatred and fear between both sides – each of which has been hijacked by a special interest: the Chechens by their Islamists, and the Russians by economic opportunists. The vast majority of the Chechens are fighting to protect their homeland, not for the thrill of murdering Russians; they are fighting for peace, as the Chechens are a war-weary people.

Conclusions

Islam is a core aspect of Chechen culture and society, but it is not the goal of the majority of Chechens to bring a radicalized Islamic jihad and terrorism to the North Caucasian region and Russia.

It is worth noting that in November and December, when Russian aircraft and artillery in Chechnya were wiping whole villages and their inhabitants off the face of the earth, and when the number of victims of war was already in the thousands, there was not a single explosion in Moscow or St. Petersburg.²⁴

The Chechens have been called one of the great military societies of the modern world, and yet one must ask how much the Russians have contributed to inflame this militancy – similarly, how much have the Russians had an effect on the Chechen self-definition of Islam? In all likelihood, a great deal.

Throughout the Chechen history, their political structure, their society, and their very identity have been constantly augmented through contact with Russian invaders. From the times of Sheikh Shamil through to the modern era, it is often the whims of the Soviet political structure that has precipitated a change in Chechen religious beliefs. The product of Islamic fanaticism, indeed, even the product of mainstream Islam as practiced by the Chechens has been at least influenced by the Russians – the greater the Bear has clamped his fist around this small nation, the greater the will of these people to resist became, and the more quickly they slid from out of his fingers with increased feelings of religiosity and nationalism. Chechnya will only become more radicalized if the present situation continues; the desperation of a people unwilling to submit will take them to desperate extremes with the ready vehicle of radical Islamism ready to take them there. As Mustapha Tlili said in his lecture at Colorado College, violent conflicts are precluded and “Driven by convictions of superior culture,” as well as by the combination of a history of colonial oppression, of cultural alienation and rejection, and by a virulent ideology. It is against this background that “fundamentalism” has taken hold, not because of any innate, irrational quality of the Chechen people. The only possibility of resolution stems from a clear analysis of the current Russian-Chechen relations, as they have evolved from their earliest time. At this time there is a fog of propaganda and misinformation spewing from both sides and it is under these circumstances that the conflict worsens, and continues.

Notes

1. “Chechen Gunmen Seize Moscow Theatre.” CNN.COM 19 Oct. 2003. 4 Oct. 2002 <http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD /europe/10/23/russia.siege/>

2. John York. Rev. of In The Caucasus, Fire and Sword, by Luigi Villari. The Academy 71 (1904).

3. NORTH CAUCASUS CONFLICT CENTER . 13 July 2000. Center for Defense Information (CDI) 18 Oct. 2003 <http://www.cdi.org/issues/Europe/ncaucasus.html/>

4. Broxup, Marie Bennigsen. “The ‘Internal’ Muslim Factor in the Politics of Russia: Tatarstan and the North Caucasus.” Central Asia and The Caucasus After the Soviet Union. Ed. Mohiaddin Mesbahi. Gainesville, FL: Univ. Press of Florida, 1994. 75-99.

5. Lieven, Anatol. Chechnya : Tombstone of Russian Power. New Haven, London: Yale. 1998

6. Chechnya : Tombstone of Russian Power

7. Barricada, Leon. Interview with “Alex.” Rec. 20 Nov. 2002. Manuscript. Interview With a Russian Anarchist, Chechnya War Veteran. Infoshop News. <http://flag.blackened.net/pipermail/infoshop-news/2002-November/002012.html>

8. The Jihad of Imam Shamyl. 17 Oct. 2003 <http://www.naqshbandi.net/haqqani/Sufi/Topics.html>

9. Griffiths, Stephan Iwan. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Threats to European Security. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993

10. Chechnya : Tombstone of Russian Power

11. Flemming, William. “The Deportation of the Chechen and Ingush Peoples: A Critical Examination.” Russia and Chechnya: The Permanent Crisis. Ed. Ben Fowkes. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. 65-87

12. Gökay, Bülent. “The Longstanding Russian and Soviet Debate over Sheikh Shamil: Anti-Imperialist Hero or Counter Revolutionary Cleric?” Russia and Chechnya : The Permanent Crisis. Ed. Ben Fowkes. Houndmills, Basingstoke , Hampshire Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. 25-65

13. Ro’i, Yaacov. “The Secularization of Islam and the USSR’s Muslim Areas” Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies. Ed. Yaacov Ro’I. Essex, England: Newberry House,1995. 5-21

14. Bennigsen, Alexandre and Marie Broxup. The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983

15. The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State.

16. Sirén, Pontus, Bülent. “The Battle for Grozny: The Russian Invasion of Chechnia, December 1994 – December 1996” Russia and Chechnya: The PermanentCrisis. Ed. Ben Fowkes. Houndmills, Basingstoke , Hampshire Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. 87-170

17. Anticipating the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Heydar Aliyev's Speech. 8 July 2003, Azerbaijani International Magazine. 16 Oct. 2003 <http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/74_folder/74.articles/74_aliyev_collapse.html>

18. Menon, Rajan. “After Empire: Russia and the Southern ‘Near Abroad.’” The New Russian Foreign Policy. Ed. Micheal Mandelbaum. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998. 100-167

19. Chechnya : Tombstone of Russian Power

20. Islam in Chechnya. 13 March 1998 Univ. of California, Berkeley. 15 Oct. 2003
<http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/caucasus/newsletter/1998-06_walker.pdf>

21. Kagarlitsky, Boris. Russia Under Yeltsin and Putin. London: Pluto Press, 2002.

22. Russia Under Yeltsin and Putin

23. Russia : Islamic Countries Unlikely to Help Chechnya. 19 Nov. 1999 Radio Free Europe, 19 Oct. 2003 <http://www.rferl.org/>

24. Kagarlitsky, Boris. Russia Under Yeltsin and Putin. London: Pluto Press, 2002.